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This work is an introduction to Social Choice Theory and Distributive Justice. It aims
to set under which conditions does exist a method to aggregate individual preferences.
We first model individual behaviour in decision making taking into account preferences
and utilities, and also choice behaviour. The objective is to understand how collective
choice can be done. Then we formulate and prove Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which
states that, under certain (and reasonable) conditions, it is impossible to find an aggre-
gation system. We also present some ways to loosen hypothesis in order to avoid this
impossibility. Finally, we redefine our whole framework to allow interpersonal compar-
isons. This lets us characterize two main ways of social deciding: the leximin principle
and the utilitarian rule.
Resum
Aquest treball és una introducció a la Teoria de l’elecció social (Social Choice Theory) i
a la Just́ıcia distributiva (Distributive Justice). Té com a objectiu determinar sota quines
condicions existeixen mètodes per agrupar les opinions dels individus d’una societat. Per
entendre com es pot triar col·lectivament primer de tot modelitzarem el comportament
individual a l’hora de triar entre alternatives. A continuació enunciarem i demostrarem el
teorema d’impossibilitat d’Arrow, que diu que, sota certes condicions (ben raonables), és
impossible trobar una manera d’escollir socialment que les satisfaci. També proposarem
algunes relaxacions d’hipòtesis per a evitar la impossibilitat. Finalment redefinirem el
nostre marc de treball per permetre comparacions entre individus d’una mateixa societat.
Això ens permetrà caracteritzar dos dels principals mètodes a l’hora de triar: el “leximin
principle” i la “utilitarian rule”.
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Social Choice Theory: Origins and Evolution
Social choice theory is an analysis of collective decision making. It starts out from
individual opinions, preferences, interests or welfare of the members of a society and
attempts to reach a collective statement in a “satisfactory” manner, that is, in a manner
compatible with the fulfillment of a variety of desirable conditions. Formal social choice
theory has its origin at the end of 1940s and beginning of 1950s with the works of Black,
Arrow and Guilbaud. It is considered a rebirth of what Borda and Condorcet started at
the end of 18th century. However, one can find numerous precursors.
According to McLean and Urken (1995) [17] several classics discussed about the good-
ness of various political system, but it is not until the appearance of Pliny the Younger(AD
61 or 62-113) that we talk about precursors of social choice. McLean and London (1990)
[16] research which are these precursors. Around AD 90 Pliny the Younger wrote a letter
to Titius Aristo where he describes a situation of manipulation of preferences in a voting
situation in the modern sense of Gibbard-Satterthwaite: a group of individuals by voting
strategically forces the voting rule to generate an outcome that the members of the group
prefer to the outcome that would have prevailed if they had not voted strategically.
Ramon Llull (ca. 1233-1316) recommends systems based on pair-wise (majority) vot-
ing on his novels “Blanquerna” and “De Arte Eleccionis”. The procedure described in
“Blanquerna” chose the candidate who had won the highest number of pair-wise compar-
isons and is identical to the one proposed by Borda in 1770. The voting rule proposed in
“De Arte Eleccionis” ended up in a method satisfying a criteria proposed by Condorcet
in 1785, but it did it in an iterative way.
In the 15th century, Nicholas of Cusa (also known as Nicholas Cusanus) in his book
“De Concordantia Catholica” devotes some paragraphs to the description of a voting
method for the election of the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. On an example with
ten candidates he assumes that the voter ranks the candidate without ties from the least
preferred to the most preferred and give marks to candidates from 1 to 10 on the basis of
this ranking. This is clearly Borda’s rule as it is now known.
Samuel von Pufendorf publishes in 1672 his book “De Jure Naturae and Gentium”,
which has caught the eye of social choice theorists and economists. He discussed weighted
voting, qualified majorities and single-peaked preferences (a domain restriction that has
become quite known in the middle of 20th century) amongst other subjects. Another
interpretation of von Pufendorf examples would be to show how manipulate voting works
as Pliny did.
Even if Nicholas of Cusa proposed Borda’s rule more than three hundred years before
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Borda, and Ramon Lull’s description of elections are generally based on pair-wise major-
ity voting announcing, maybe, Condorcet, their works cannot be compared with those of
Borda and Condorcet. Borda was a great applied scientist of his time and Condorcet’s
contribution to human knowledge is still probably underestimated. What they left us on
voting is not commensurate with what Cusanus or Lull left. Condorcet strongly advo-
cated a binary notion, i.e. pairwise comparisons of candidates, whereas Borda focused
on a positional approach where the positions of candidates in the individual preference
orderings matter. A third author from 18th century shall be pointed out although his
contributions to social choice theory are quite indirect. Jeremy Bentham in 1789 pub-
lished “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation” where he bets for
“the greatest happiness of the greatest number”. It can be somehow understood as the
utilitarian way of choosing without having defined utility functions yet.
During the 19th century, in spite of the development of democratic institutions, the
theory of social choice was rather dormant. Despite, it is worth naming Charles Lutwidge
Dodgson, better known as Lewis Carroll, the author of “Alice in Wonderland”, since he
dealt with cyclical majorities and proposed a rule, based on pairwise comparisons, which
avoids such cycles.
As said before, formal social choice theory stands out with the works of Arrow, Black
and Guilbaud. Since them several social choice theorists have emerged and social choice
theory has done great advances. However we shall point out two aspects towards which
Social Choice Theory has focused. The first one is the preference aggregation and was
started by Kenneth Arrow2 with his theorem. It works with binary relations since its
starting point is individual preference of members of society. Neither comparison between
individuals nor cardinal measure of preferences are allowed. The second one was started
by Amartya Sen.3 He stated that by assigning real numbers to alternatives, welfare
profiles contain a lot of information over and above the profiles of binary relations on X
they induce. So one shall aggregate welfare instead of preferences. This would allow us to
compare between individuals and to use cardinal information when needed. In this way
we can evaluate the welfare of a society, with respect to other possible states.
It is worth noting that Gerard Debreu4 was also at the beginning of Social Choice,
with the relationship between preferences and utilities.
Recently, Social Choice Theory has developed several branches. Empirical social
choice, judgment aggregation, cooperative bargaining, behavioural social choice, fair di-
vision, computational social choice theory, theories of probability aggregation, theories of
general attitude aggregation, collective decision-making in non-human animals and appli-
cations to social epistemology are some issues on which experts are working at. As should
be evident, social choice theory is a vast field.
2Kenneth J. Arrow (1921-2017) got the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1972, joint with John Hicks,
“for their pioneering contributions to general economic equilibrium theory and welfare theory”. he was a
mathematician.
3Amartya K. Sen (1933) got the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1998, “for his contributions to welfare
economics”.
4Gerard Debreu (1921-2004) got the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1983, “for having incorporated
new analytical methods into economic theory and for his rigorous reformulation of the theory of general
equilibrium”. He was a mathematician and attended École Normale Supérieure with Henri Cartan. He
was influenced by the books of N. Bourbaki.
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About this work
Let us briefly describe the contents of this work. Chapter 1 sets the basis to face
social choice problems; it aims to model individual behaviour when making decisions. We
introduce individual decision making theory in an abstract way, describe two approaches
to modeling a person’s decisions and give conditions to set when to move from one to
another.
Chapter 2 discusses Arrow’s famous impossibility theorem. We first present some
possible frameworks when studying social decision making and give some examples of how
social aggregation can be made. We shall present two different proofs of Arrow’s theorem.
The first one is Arrow’s original proof, and the second one emphasises informational aspect
within the Arrovian set-up. Finally, we point out some possibilities if one wants to avoid
impossibilities.
Chapter 3 is the main issue of this work. Alternative theories of distributive justice
are its topic. We redefine the whole set-up and widen it in order to be able to compare
individuals and discuss some justice conditions. The two main ways of social deciding,
utilitarianism and the Rawlsian maximin/leximin principle, are contrasted with each other
and characterized from different viewpoints.
4 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1
Preferences and utility functions
In this chapter we analyze the preferences of one single agent over a set of different
alternatives and which conditions we ask to consider these preferences as belonging to a
rational agent. Moreover we give conditions to ensure when a preference relation can be
represented by an utility function. We will mainly follow Mas-Colell et al. (1995) [15]
and Jehle and Reny (2001) [12].
1.1 Decision problems
The starting point for any individual decision problem is a set of possible, mutually
exclusive, alternatives, which will be denoted by X. There are two distinct approaches to
modeling individual choice behaviours. The first one, defined in Section 1.2, focuses on
decision maker’s tastes and interprets them as a binary relation over the set of alternatives.
The second approach is defined in Section 1.3 and defends that an individual’s primitive
feature is being able to choose amongst alternatives.
Let X = {x, y, z, . . .} denote the set of all conceivable social states, which we call
alternatives. This can be a finite set, for example a group of candidates in an election,
or countable as the different budgets for a project. It can be also an uncountable set
such as the combinations of goods and services a consumer may choose. We denote by
N = {1, . . . , n} a finite set of individuals, with n ≥ 2.
1.2 Preference relations
In the preference-based approach, the objectives of a decision maker are summarized
in a preference relation on X, denoted by R. Set X is usually referred as the set of
alternatives. The relation R is a subset of ordered pairs of the product X × X; for
example we write xRy to indicate that the pair (x, y) ∈ X × X is in the subset given
by R. Now, when we speak about individual i’s preference, i ∈ N, we just write Ri. A
binary relation gives just a subset of the ordered pairs of the product X×X. A preference
relation R is a binary relation on the set X. To denote this preference relation, if aRb
(with a, b ∈ X) we will say that a is at least as good as b.
From this relation we can derive to two other important relations: the strict preference
relation P and the indifference relation I, both defined as follows. Let a and b be members
5
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of a set X,
(i) we say that a is strictly preferred to b, and denote it by aPb if and only if aRb∧¬ bRa,
(ii) we say that a is indifferent to b, and denote it by aIb if and only if aRb ∧ bRa.
In much of social choice theory, individuals are assumed to be rational which means that
their preference relation is complete and transitive.
Definition 1.1. A preference relation R on X is rational if it is, for all a, b, c ∈ X,
1. reflexive, i.e. aRa,
2. transitive, i.e. (aRb ∧ bRc)→ aRc, and
3. complete, i.e. ∀a, b ∈ X it holds aRb ∨ bRa.
When a preference relation is rational, we call it a preference ordering.
Completeness means that the individual has a well-defined preference between every
two alternatives; he or she can compare any two alternatives in X. Transitivity requires
the decision maker to choose in a consistent way. Sometimes, though, transitivity may
be quite a hard condition to be held, and may only be needed either quasi-transitivity or
acyclicity.
Definition 1.2. R is said to be quasi-transitive if P is transitive.
Definition 1.3. R is said to be acyclical if for all finite sequences x1, x2, . . . , xk ∈ X it
never holds x1Px2 ∧ x2Px3 ∧ . . . ∧ xk−1Pxk ∧ xkPx1.
All three definition aim to avoid cycles on the preference relations. We may point out
some properties that follow from preference relations and orderings. The strict preference
relation P is irreflexive and transitive. The indifference relation I is reflexive, symmetrical
and transitive, which means it is an equivalence relation. Note that R being transitive
means R is quasi transitive, and so, requires R to be acyclical. If R is an ordering, it also
holds aPb ∧ bRc→ aRc.
Given an alternative a ∈ X, the set formed by those alternatives which are at least
as good as a is defined to be its “at least as good as” set, and denote it by Ra, and the
set formed by those alternatives which are no better than a id defined as its “no better
than” set and denote it as aR. More formally, we define
Ra = {b ∈ X | bRa} and aR = {b ∈ X | aRb}.
In the same way we could also define strictly preferred sets aP and Pa and indifference
sets aI = Ia.
We may sometimes need some topological regularity on preference orderings in order
to work in an easier way. Although in social choice it is not widely needed, in some cases
we may need our relations to hold continuity.
Definition 1.4. We say that a binary relation R on X is continuous if the sets aR and
Ra are closed sets in X.
Continuity will be most used when considering X as a subset on Rn. In this case it is
guaranteed that sudden preference reversals do not occur. Note that continuity implies
the indifference set to be also closed. Continuity requirements are closely related to utility
functions, which are studied in the next paragraph.
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Utility functions
Utility functions are simply a convenient device for summarizing the information con-
tained in the consumer’s preference relation. It allows to translate preferences to numbers,
and then apply other tools. Sometimes it is easier to work with preference relations and
its associated sets and other times it is easier to work with utility functions, especially
when employing calculus methods.
Definition 1.5. Let R be a preference relation on a set X. An utility function u repre-
senting R is a function u : X −→ R such that ∀a, b ∈ X, it holds
aRb ⇐⇒ u(a) ≥ u(b).
If all we require of a preference relation is that ranking between alternatives be mean-
ingful, and all we require of a utility function representing that preference relation is that
it reflects the ordering of alternatives, then any other function that assigns numbers to
alternatives in the same order as the utility function does will also represent that prefer-
ence relation. It is clear then that uniqueness of utility functions is not met. However, in
this case, any utility function representing that relation is capable of conveying to us is
ordinal information. The following result characterizes which utility functions represent
a preference relation.
Proposition 1.1. Let R be a preference relation on X and suppose u(x) is an utility
function that represents R. Then a function v(x) also represents R if and only if there
exists a function f, f : R −→ R, which is strictly increasing on the set of values taken by
u, such that v = f ◦ u.
Proof. Let us suppose there exists f satisfying such hypothesis. Let a, b ∈ X be two
alternatives. Then,
v(a) > v(b)⇐⇒ f(u(a)) > f(u(b))⇐⇒ u(a) > u(b)⇐⇒ aPb.
In the same way v(a) = v(b)⇐⇒ aIb, so v(a) ≥ v(b)⇐⇒ aRb.
Let us now suppose u represents R and v also represents R. Consider the function
that assigns v(x) to every u(x) for any x ∈ X. This is a strictly increasing function since
u(a) > u(b)⇐⇒ aPb⇐⇒ v(a) > v(b).
It is clear that if an utility function represents a preference relation, this one has to be
rational. However, not every rational preference relation can be described by some utility
function. If X is a finite or countable set, then every rational preference can be described
by an utility function, but when X is non-countable, things get more complicated. More-
over, in order to easily calculate and achieve some results, one may also guarantee this
utility function to be continuous. These are our next results. The following theorem and
proposition assure the existence of a continuous utility function representing a preference
relation under certain restrictions. To this end we need some definitions.
A gap of a set S ⊆ R = R ∪ {+∞,−∞} is a maximal non-degenerate interval of the
complement of S which has an upper and lower bound in S. The next proposition was
proved by Debreu (1954) [5], and we use this result to prove our Theorem 1.1.
Proposition 1.2 (Debreu, 1954). If S is a subset of the extended real line R = R ∪
{+∞,−∞}, there exists an increasing function g from S to R such that all the gaps of
g(S) are open.
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Theorem 1.1. Let X be a topological space satisfying the second axiom of countability1
and R a continuous preference ordering defined on X. Then there exists a continuous
utility function u representing R.
Proof. We will first prove the existence of u and then its continuity.
Let {Bn}n∈N denote the sets of the countable base of the topology of X. Let a ∈ X








To u representing R it has to be aRb ⇐⇒ u(a) ≥ u(b) for a, b ∈ X. If aRb, then
N(a) ⊇ N(b), so that u(a) ≥ u(b). To show the other implication, let us suppose ¬aRb,
hence bPa. This means there exists an n ∈ N(b) such that a ∈ Bn but not n ∈ N(a).
Thus, N(a) ( N(b) and u(a) < u(b), hence not u(a) ≥ u(b).
To show continuity, let us now consider S an arbitrary set of R. Because of Proposition
1.2, there exists an increasing function g from S to R such that all the gaps of g(S) are
open.
We then define a new utility function v = g ◦ u. The function v(x) is also an utility
function representing R. All the gaps of v(X) are open. To show that v is continuous it
suffices to show that ∀t ∈ R the sets v−1([t,+∞]) and v−1([−∞, t]) are closed sets.
If t ∈ v(X), then there exists y ∈ X such that v(y) = t. Given that case, v−1([t,+∞]) =
{x ∈ X | xRy} and v−1([−∞, t]) = {x ∈ X | yRx}. Both sets are closed because of R
being a continuous preference ordering.
We discuss now the cases in which t /∈ v(X). If t /∈ v(X) and is not contained in a gap,
then there are three possibilities:
(i) t ≤ infx∈X v(X). This means v−1([t,+∞]) = X and v−1([−∞, t]) = ∅. Both are
closed sets.






























1A topological space satisfies the second axiom of countability if the topology has a countable base.
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Both are intersection of closed sets, so both are closed sets.
Finally, if t belongs to a gap, it must be an open gap ]a, b[ with a, b ∈ v(X). Then
v−1([t,+∞]) = v−1([b,+∞]),
v−1([−∞, t]) = v−1([−∞, a]).
Both are closed sets, so v is a continuous utility function representing R.
1.3 Choice Rules
In the second approach to the theory of decision making, choice behaviour itself is
taken to be the primitive object of the theory. Formally, choice behaviour is represented
by means of a choice structure. This is a common approach when we deal with microe-
conomics (see Mas-Colell et al., 1995 [15]).
Recall that X is the set of alternatives (finite or infinite).
Definition 1.6. A choice structure on X is a pair (B, C(·)) where
(i) B is a family of non-empty subsets of X,
(ii) C(·) is a function C : B −→ B that assigns a non-empty set of chosen elements of
X to every set B in B such that C(B) ⊆ B.
The consideration of the family B allows to consider not all subset of the alternatives
as acceptable. We will denote an arbitrary member of B by the letter B. We say that
C(B) contains all alternatives chosen by the individual among all possible alternatives in
B.
As when working with preferences, when working with choice structures we may want
to impose some restrictions of consistency regarding an individual’s choice behaviour. The
weak axiom of revealed preference reflects this consistency.
Definition 1.7. Let (B, C(·)) be a choice structure on X. Let B ∈ B be a subset of X,
and let a, b ∈ B be two alternatives such that a ∈ C(B). We say that this choice structure
satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference if for any B′ ∈ B with a, b ∈ B′ and
b ∈ C(B′), we must also have a ∈ C(B′).
The weak axiom of revealed preference says that whenever a is chosen from a set
containing a and b there cannot be another set containing a and b such that b is chosen
and a not.
Now we relate choice structures on X with preference relations on X. First we associate
in a natural way a preference relation to a choice structure.
Given a choice structure, we can define a preference relation from the observed choice
behaviour in C(·). We call it the revealed preference relation.
Definition 1.8. Let (B, C(·)) be a choice structure on X. We define the revealed pref-
erence relation R∗ by:
aR∗b ⇐⇒ ∃B ∈ B such that a, b ∈ B and a ∈ C(B).
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Notice that this relation, depending on the properties of the choice structure, may be
rational or not.
On the other hand, one may want to know whether a rational preference defines a
choice structure satisfying the weak axiom of revealed preference or not. Also one may
ask the reciprocal; whether given a choice structures satisfying the weak axiom of revealed
preference, the revealed preference relation is a rational one.
To answer these questions one may need to define a choice structure with a given
preference ordering. Given a preference ordering and a subset B ⊆ X we define the
following choice rule:
C∗(B,R) = {a ∈ B | aRb for every b ∈ B}.
Notice that C∗(B,R) may be empty for some B. However, when X is finite, or when
suitable conditions are held, such as continuity on R, non-emptiness of C∗(B,R) can be
assured. From now on we will suppose C∗(B,R) is a non-empty set.
Proposition 1.3. Let R be a preference ordering on X. Then, the choice structure gen-
erated by R, that is (B, C∗(·, R)), satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference.
Proof. Let B ∈ B and let a, b ∈ B be two alternatives such that a ∈ C∗(B,R). This
implies aRb by definition of C∗(B,R). Let now B′ ∈ B with a, b ∈ B′ such that b ∈
C(B′, R). This means that for every c ∈ B′ it holds bRc. But, by transitivity we have aRc
and, hence, a ∈ C(B′, R) so the weak axiom of revealed preference is satisfied.
Having a choice structure satisfying the weak axiom of revealed preference, however,
does no always mean to have a rational preference relation. We have to add some condi-
tions and introduce the notion of rationalization of a choice structure to make language
easier.
Definition 1.9. Let (B, C(·)) be a choice structure on X and R a rational preference
relation. We say that R rationalizes C(·) relative to B if
C(B) = C∗(B,R) for all B ∈ B.
This means that if the choice structure is generated by R, then R rationalizes the choice
structure. Notice that, in general, there may be more that one rationalizing relation for
a given choice structure.
By Proposition 1.3 it holds that if there exists a rationalizing preference relation, then
the corresponding choice structure it rationalizes must satisfy the weak axiom of revealed
preference. So, only choice rules that satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference can be
rationalized, but it is not a sufficient condition. The following proposition gives sufficient
conditions to a choice rule to be rationalized.
Proposition 1.4. Let (B, C(·)) be a choice structure on X such that:
(i) satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference,
(ii) B includes all subsets of X of up to three elements.
Then, there is a rational preference relation R that rationalizes the choice structure. Fur-
thermore, R is the only preference relation that does so.
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Proof. The main candidate to rationalize a choice structure is the revealed preference
relation R∗. We have to prove that it is a rational relation, that it rationalizes the choice
structure and that it is the only one doing so.
Completeness is argued as follows. By assumption (ii), every pair of alternatives {a, b}
belongs to B. This means either a ∈ C({a, b}) or b ∈ C({a, b}) and, by definition of
revealed preference relation, it holds either aR∗b or bR∗a, or both. Thus, R∗ is complete.
To prove transitivity, let a, b, c be alternatives such that aR∗b and bR∗c. Consider the
set {a, b, c} ∈ B. Proving that a ∈ C({a, b, c}) is sufficient to show transitivity because of
the definition of revealed preference. As C({a, b, c}) 6= ∅, at least one alternative must be
in C({a, b, c}). If a ∈ C({a, b, c}), we obtain aR∗c, as required. If b ∈ C({a, b, c}), since
aR∗b, the weak axiom of revealed preference implies a ∈ C({a, b, c}). If c ∈ C({a, b, c}),
since bR∗c the weak axiom of revealed preference implies b ∈ C({a, b, c}), so that we are
in the previous case. Thus, a ∈ C({a, b, c}) and aR∗c as required.
To show that it rationalizes the choice structure we have to prove C(B) = C∗(B,R∗)
for all B ∈ B. Let B ∈ B such that a ∈ C(B). Then ∀b ∈ B it holds aR∗b, so this means
a ∈ C(B,R∗). Thus, C(B) ⊆ C(B,R∗). Suppose now a ∈ C(B,R∗). This means aR∗b
for all b ∈ B. Then, for every b there must exist a set Bb ∈ B such that a, b ∈ Bb and
a ∈ C(Bb). As C(B) 6= ∅ and that holds for every b, a ∈ C(B). Thus, C(B,R∗) ⊆ C(B).
It is easy to establish uniqueness. Since B includes all subsets of X formed by two
elements, the choice structure determines unambiguously the relation between every pair
of alternatives.
We have established when a preference relation can be interpreted as a choice structure
satisfying the weak axiom of revealed preference and when a choice structure defines a
rational preference relation.
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Chapter 2
Arrow’s impossibility Theorem
Arrow’s Theorem is the cornerstone in Social Choice Theory and also in Political
Science. It says, essentially, that any procedure to obtain a preference relation out of
the preferences of a population or constituency such that it respects several minimal
conditions, is impossible.
Kenneth J. Arrow formulated his impossibility Theorem in his book Social Choice and
Individual Values (1951). Arrow got the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1972 (joint
with John R. Hicks) “for their pioneering contributions to general economic equilibrium
theory and welfare theory”.
When he first showed the general impossibility of a social welfare function this result
was seen with skepticism, but soon it was considered very important as it is. To set
Arrow’s framework and prove his theorem we will mainly follow Gaertner (2001) [9] and
Gaertner (2009) [8].
2.1 Social Aggregation
Our aim in the following two chapters is to prove whether it exists or not a way to
choose a social state based on what individuals of such society prefer. We will ask this
way of choosing to satisfy certain properties of justice and discuss what do they mean.
Let X = {a, b, c, . . .} be the set of all possible mutually exclusive alternatives or social
states and N = {1, 2, . . . , n} the set of all individuals or voters. Notice that the set of
alternatives may be infinite while the set of individuals will be always a finite one. We
may ask the set of individuals to be infinite when treating issues in an intergenerational
view for example, but this is not the case. See, for instance, Zame (2007) [28] and Lauwers
(2012) [13]. Let us suppose each individual i ∈ N has its own preference relation on X
and denote it by Ri. Without any index, R refers to society’s preferences and we will call
it social preference relation.
The way to aggregate preferences will be a function, so we have to decide in which sets
the domain and the image are defined. Let A denote the set of preference relations on
X, and B denote the set of preference relations on X which are reflexive and complete,
C denote the set of preference relations which are reflexive, complete and acyclical on
X, D the set of reflexive, complete and quasi-transitive preference relations on X and
E denote the set of preference orderings. Obviously, it holds E ⊆ D ⊆ C ⊆ B ⊆ A.
Moreover A′,B′, C′,D′, E ′ will denote subsets of A,B, C,D, E respectively satisfying certain
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conditions. A′n will denote the Cartesian product A′ × . . .×A′, n times. An element of
A′n is an n-tuple (R1, . . . , Rn) and we will call it a profile of preference relations.
A collective choice rule is a mapping f from A′n to A. A social welfare function is a
mapping f from E ′n to E . A social welfare function for quasi-transitive preferences (QT)
is a mapping from D′n to E . A social decision function of type QT is a mapping from E ′n
to D. A social decision function is a mapping from E ′n to C.
Notice that a social decision function is a collective choice rule such that a choice
function is generated over the set of alternatives. In this project only social welfare
functions will be studied widely, but other types must be explained since they may be
a solution for some of our problems. On Gaertner (2001) [9] can be found an extended
study about which role do domains play in social aggregation.
Before going deep in this issue, some example shall be pointed out in order to un-
derstand what we mean by social aggregation. These examples are taken from Gaertner
(2009) [8] and show how different ways of choosing may lead to different results. We
abstain from clarifying which type of function they are as it may be quite hard for an
introduction. Some of them will be deeper studied later on.
Let us suppose a society with only three individuals (|N | = 3) and a set of four
alternatives: X = {a, b, c, d}. Let us suppose that every individual is able to give a value
to every alternative. It could be, for instance, how can they distribute a cake. Suppose







































Each individual only takes care about how much does he or she win, so the preferences
of each individual are the following:
1 2 3
a, b a, c b, c
d d d
c b a
Alternatives on the same level are supposed to be indifferent. In this way for individual
1 we have, aI1b−, aP 1d, dP 1c and all combinations we can get using transitivity and
completeness. Now, we shall introduce various choice rules:
Example 2.1 (Simple majority rule). The reader may be familiar with this kind of
aggregation. It consists on counting votes “for” and “against” between two alternatives.
Let us call N(aPb) the number of individuals that prefer alternative a rather than alterna-
tive b. Formally, we can define the simple majority rule by aRb ⇐⇒ N(aPb) ≥ N(bPa).
In this case, using the simple majority rule, we would get that a, b and c are indifferent
to each other and each of them is preferred to d.
Example 2.2 (Absolute majority rule). In this case, an alternative is preferred to
another if it has more than half of the votes. This means, aPb ⇐⇒ N(aPb) > 12 |N |.
This would lead us aPd, bPd and cPd, and indifference between a, b and c, as in the
simple majority rule.
Example 2.3 (Borda rule). The Borda rule ranks the alternatives and weights every
rank. Thus, depending on the weight assigned to every rank, the result may be one or
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another. There is mainly a way to weight every rank, and in this case it ranks 2.5 to the
first alternatives, 1 to the second and 0 to the third. To understand how the Borda rule
works and its variations see Gaertner (2009)[8].
Example 2.4 (Utilitarian rule). The utilitarian rule consists in maximizing the sum







cake and 0 for no cake. So, utilities of each alternatives are the following:
(i) u(a) = 12 +
1
2 + 0 = 1,
(ii) u(b) = 12 + 0 +
1
2 = 1,
(iii) u(c) = 0 + 12 +
1
2 = 1,





So all alternatives are indifferent in the utilitarian view.
Example 2.5 (Rawls’ approach). Rawls stood up for favouring the worst-off individuals
in society. Note that for alternatives a, b and c, the worst-off person always gets 0, so
they would be indifferent to each other. But in alternative d the worst-off individual gets
1
3 , so if we ranked any of the first three alternatives against d, d would be chosen.
Example 2.6 (Maximize the product of utilities). In such a case, d would be the
only winner since:
(i) u(a) = 12 ·
1
2 · 0 = 0,
(ii) u(b) = 12 · 0 ·
1
2 = 0,
(iii) u(c) = 0 · 12 ·
1
2 = 0,







Notice that not all of them must be social welfare functions. If we had chosen three
alternatives such that aP 1bP 1c, bP 2cP 2a and cP 3aP 3b, we would see a cyclical relation
aPbPcPa.
2.2 Arrow’s impossibility theorem
As said before, the aim of this chapter is to show whether it exists or not a function f
giving a preference ordering R := f(R1, . . . , Rn) that meets certain conditions. We will
name this kind of function f a social welfare function. Let E be the set of all possible
rational relations in X, that is E = {R ⊆ X×X | R is transitive and complete}. Arrow, in
his book Social Choice and Individual Values (1951), considered four minimal conditions
that every social welfare function should hold:
Condition (U – Unrestricted Domain). The domain of f includes all possible com-
binations of individual preference relations on X, which means the domain of f is En.
Condition (WP – Weak Pareto Principle). For any pair of alternatives a, b ∈ X if,
for every i ∈ N it holds aP ib, then aPb.
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Condition (IIA – Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives). Given two profiles
of individual orderings (R11, . . . , R
n
1 ) and (R
1
2, . . . , R
n
2 ) if for some a, b ∈ X and ∀i ∈ N it
holds aRi1b←→ aRi2b ∧ bRi1a←→ bRi2a, then it holds aR1b←→ aR2b∧ bR1a←→ bR2a.
Condition (D – Non-dictatorship). There is no individual k ∈ N such that for all
profiles in the domain of f and ∀ a, b ∈ X, if aP kb, then aPb. If there exists such indi-
vidual, we will call him a dictator.
Condition U means that every preference ordering should be taken into consideration.
Condition WP demands that if everyone strictly prefers a to b, then the same should hold
also for society’s preference. Condition IIA requires the social welfare function taking into
consideration only individuals’ preferences of a and b when comparing this alternatives
and nothing more. Individuals’ preferences between a and a third alternative c should
not count. And finally, condition D refers to the issue that there should be no dictator. A
dictator is defined as an individual whose preferences must become society’s preferences
for all pairs of alternatives.
Arrow stated that there was no social welfare function satisfying these conditions. They
have been fully discussed and loosen some of them may change the results of the theorem.
See Sen (1970) [21] for a more accurate discussion. Before formulating the impossibility
theorem, let us introduce two definitions and a lemma that will be necessary for the proof
of the theorem.
Definition 2.1. A set of individuals V ⊆ N is almost decisive for some a ∈ X against
some b ∈ X when (∀i ∈ V aP ib ∧ ∀i /∈ V bP ia) −→ aPb.
Definition 2.2. A set of individuals V ⊆ N is decisive for some a ∈ X against some
b ∈ X when (∀i ∈ V aP ib) −→ aPb.
Let us now consider that V has a single element V = {k}. We say that an individual
k is almost decisive (resp. decisive) if the set formed by only this individual is almost
decisive (resp. decisive). We will denote that an individual k ∈ N is almost decisive for
a against b by D(a, b) and that an individual k ∈ N is decisive for a against b by D(a, b).
Notice that D(a, b) implies D(a, b).
Lemma 2.1. Let us consider a finite set of individuals N and let X be the set of al-
ternatives with |X| ≥ 3. If there is some individual k ∈ N who is almost decisive for
some ordered pair of alternatives (a, b) and there is a social welfare function that satisfies
conditions U, WP and IIA, then this individual k is a dictator.
Proof. Let us assume that individual k ∈ N is almost decisive for some a against some
b. Let c be another alternative. We will show that, given such hypothesis, k is decisive
for every ordered pair from the triplet of alternatives (a, b, c), which means that k is a
dictator for any three alternatives that contain a and b. Then we will see that this can be
extended to any finite number of alternatives.
Formally written, given a set of three alternatives X = {a, b, c} and an individual
k ∈ N, we suppose (aP kb∧∀i 6= k bP ia) −→ aPb and (bP ka∧∀i 6= k aP ib) −→ bPa. We
want to prove the following implications:
(a) aP kc −→ aPc,
(b) bP kc −→ bPc,
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(c) cP ka −→ cPa,
(d) cP kb −→ cPb,
(e) aP kb −→ aPb,
(f) bP ka −→ bPa.
Notice that item (a) is similar to item (b), item (c) is similar to item (d) and item (e) is
similar to item (f). So we will show only items (a), (c) and (e).
Let us suppose first aP kc. By condition U, we can consider any preference profile.
Then consider the following profile:
aP kb ∧ bP kc
bP ia ∧ bP ic, ∀i 6= k.
Note that the preference between a and c remain unspecified for all individuals except
k. As k is almost decisive for x against y, we have aPb. bPc is due to condition WP.
By transitivity we obtain aPc. Condition IIA says that the social relation between two
alternatives must only be consequence of the relation of individuals between these two
alternatives and no other alternative has a role to play. But if we focus on the profile
above, we only assumed aP kc; the relation between a and c of all other individuals could
have been any. This means that aPc is consequence of individual k alone whichever profile
we consider. This means aP kc→ aPc.
Similar arguments will be used to prove (c) and (e). Let us now suppose cP ka and consider
the following profile:
cP ka ∧ aP kb
cP ia ∧ bP ia ∀i 6= k.
Then we have cPa and aPb, and though, cPb. As relation P k is transitive, it is the unique
that specified the relation between c and b, so we can use the same argument as above
and obtain cP kb→ cPb as wanted.
Let us finally suppose aP kb and consider the following profile:
aP kc ∧ cP kb
cP ia ∧ cP ib ∀i 6= k.
By condition WP we have cPb. Since above we have seen aP kc → aPc, we fathom aPb
by transitivity. As we only specified the relation between a and b aof individual k, we
conclude aP kb→ aPb by IIA. Now let us show that this can be extended to any number
of alternatives. We suppose that individual k is almost decisive for a against b. If we
consider the triple (a, b, c), we have shown that k is decisive for a against c, therefore,
it is also almost decisive. So we now consider the triple (a, c, d), which implies that k is
decisive for c against d. This means that if k is almost decisive for a against b, then it is
decisive for any pair (c, d)
Now we are in the position to state and prove the impossibility theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (Arrow’s impossibility Theorem). For a finite number of individuals,
if |X| ≥ 3, then there is no social welfare function f : En −→ E that simultaneously
satisfies conditions U, WP, IIA and D.
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Proof. The procedure will be to show that there always exists an almost decisive individual
for every pair of alternatives.
For every pair of alternatives (a, b) there exists at least one almost decisive set, N .
Let us choose one of the smallest sets among all almost decisive sets for some pair of
alternatives and let us call it V . This means that if V ′ is an almost decisive for any pair
of alternatives, then either V ⊆ V ′ or V and V ′ are not comparable. Note that V may not
be unique. Let us suppose V contains at least two individuals and is almost decisive for
a against b. Let us now consider V as the disjoint union V = V1 ∪ V2, where V1 contains
a single individual and V2 the rest from V . We introduce now a third alternative c and
postulate the following profile (we can do it due to condition U ):
For k ∈ V1: aP kb ∧ bP kc
For all i ∈ V2: cP ia ∧ aP ib
For all j ∈ N \ V : bP jc ∧ cP ja
As V is almost decisive for a against b, we obtain aPb. Besides, it cannot hold cPb. If it
were the case, V2 would be an almost decisive set for c against b (and though for every pair
of alternatives) and it would lead us to contradiction with the fact that V is a smallest
set. Thus bRc. Since R is a transitive relation, we obtain aRc. But then V1 would be
almost decisive for a against c, also in contradiction with V being smallest. Then, V must
contain a single element and, because of the previous lemma, it must be a dictator.
2.3 Another approach to Arrow’s theorem
In this section we will see a manner of reformulating Arrow’s theorem. Although we
may change some suppositions, the result is indeed the same as before. We will redefine
the whole Arrowian setup in terms of utility functions, that are defined in Euclidean
spaces. Let us consider alternatives as points in Rd for some d ∈ N. Thus X ⊆ Rd.
As before, we suppose that preference relations Ri, i ∈ N are complete and transitive,
but we now add continuity. In Chapter 1 we saw that if a binary relation defined in Rd
is transitive, complete and continuous, then it can be represented by an utility function
ui, for all i ∈ N. So, instead of working with binary relations, we will work with utility
functions and show that there does not exist a social welfare function f(u1, . . . , un) that
follows the same previous conditions.
As before, we want to obtain an ordering, so our function will go from U × · · · × U
n-times to E . We will call this function a social welfare function although it does not
adjust to the definition given in Section 2.1. This is because utility functions come from
preference orderings and one may see that the results do not change. RU is the ordering
generated by f when the utility profile is U = (u1, . . . , un) – when needed, we will put
U(a) = (u1(a), . . . , un(a)) for a ∈ X –. From now on we will denote individuals’ utility by
a lowercase u and profiles of utilities by capital letters U . Let us redefine such conditions
in terms of utility:
Condition (U - Unrestricted Domain). The domain of f is Un.
Condition (WP - Weak Pareto Principle). For any pair of alternatives a, b ∈ X if,
for every i ∈ N it holds ui(a) > ui(b), then aPUb.
Condition (IIA - Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives). Given two profiles of
individual utility functions U1 = (u
1
1, . . . , u
n
1 ) and U2 = (u
1
2, . . . , u
n
2 ) and for all a, b ∈ X,
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if ∀ i ∈ N it holds ui1(a) = ui2(a) and ui1(b) = ui2(b) i.e., U1(a) = U2(a) ∧ U1(b) = U2(b),
then it holds aRU1b⇐⇒ aRU2b and bRU1a⇐⇒ bRU2a.
Condition (D - Non-dictatorship). There is no individual k ∈ N such that for all
profiles in the domain of f and ∀a, b ∈ X, if uk(a) > uk(b), then aPUb.
As said before, this result differs slightly from the one on the previous chapter and
another condition is needed. We now introduce a condition called Pareto Indifference,
which requires that if all members are indifferent between a pair of alternatives the same
should hold for society’s preference over this pair.
Condition (PI - Pareto Indifference). ∀ a, b ∈ X and ∀U ∈ Un it holds U(a) =
U(b)⇒ aIUb.
We also define another condition called strong neutrality. It is related to conditions
IIA and PI imposed on f , since these imply that f also holds strong neutrality.
Condition (SN - Strong Neutrality). Let a, b, c, d ∈ X be alternatives and U1, U2 two
profiles of utility functions. If U1(a) = U2(c) and U1(b) = U2(d), then aRU1b⇐⇒ cRU2d.
Strong neutrality requires that the social evaluation functional f ignore all non-utility
information with respect to the alternatives, such as names or rights or claims or pro-
cedural aspects. The only information that counts is the vector of individual utilities
associated with any social alternative.
Now we give some relationships between these conditions.
Lemma 2.2. Let f be a social welfare function satisfying conditions U, PI and IIA. Let
a, b, c ∈ X be alternatives with b 6= c and U1 and U2 be two profiles of utility functions such
that U1(a) = U2(a) and U1(b) = U2(c). Then aRU1b implies aRU2c and bRU1a implies
cRU2a. We will denote this as {a, b}N{a, c}.
Proof. By condition U we can consider another profile of alternatives U3 that satisfies
U3(a) = U1(a) and U3(b) = U3(c) = U1(b). By condition PI, we have bIU3c. Let us now
suppose aRU1b. Since U1 and U3 give the same value to a and so they do to b, it holds
aRU3b by IIA. By transitivity, we have aRU3c. As before, we have aRU2c by IIA. Thus,
aRU1b implies aRU2c. An analogous argument is used for bRU1a implying cRU1a.
Proposition 2.1. Let f be a social welfare function satisfying condition U. Then condi-
tions IIA and PI hold iff condition SN does.
Proof. Let us suppose the social welfare function satisfies SN. Considering a = c and
b = d, IIA holds. Setting as well U1 = U2, PI holds. Let us now suppose the social welfare
function satisfies IIA and PI. Let a, b, c, d ∈ X be alternatives and U1, U2 two profiles of
utility functions such that U1(a) = U2(c) and U1(b) = U(d). We can consider a third
profile of alternatives U3 such that U3(a) = U3(c) = U1(a) and U3(b) = U3(d) = U1(b).
Let us suppose aRU1b and we want to see cRU2d. By IIA, we have aRU3b. By PI we
have cIU3a and bIU3d. By transitivity it holds cRU3d and, again by IIA, we have cRU2d
as wanted.
Proposition 2.2. If f satisfies conditions U and SN, then there is an ordering R∗ defined
on Rn. Besides, if f fulfills conditions U, IIA and PI, the ordering R∗ inherits these
properties.
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Proof. We define R∗ as follows: ∀v, w ∈ Rn, vR∗w iff there exist a, b ∈ X and U ∈ Un
such that v = U(a), w = U(b) and aRb. Since R is complete, R∗ is complete. To establish
transitivity, let us consider v, w, z ∈ Rn such that vRw and wRz. By definition, there
exist a, b, c ∈ X and U ∈ Un such that v = U(a), w = U(b) and z = U(c). By condition
SN, aRb and bRc. As R is an ordering, aRc and thus vR∗z. D’Aspremont and Gevers
(1977) [4] prove that R∗ inherits these properties.
Notice that utilities give a number to every alternative. There are infinite utility
functions representing a preference ordering and we must, somehow, set a condition for
them to be the same. We recall Proposition 1.1 and set it as a condition. Although it
seems quite obvious in the framework given until now, it may change in Chapter 3.
Condition (ON - Ordinal Measure, Non-comparable Utilities). ∀U1, U2 ∈ Un,
let, for every i ∈ N , φi be a strictly increasing transformation. If ∀ i ∈ N and ∀ a ∈ X
it holds ui2(a) = φ
i(ui1(a)), then RU1 = RU2. Note that u
i
1(·) and ui2(·) are the utility
components of profiles U1 and U2 respectively.
Now we are in the position to state and prove the corresponding version of Arrow’s
Theorem.
Theorem 2.2. For a finite number of individuals and at least three alternatives, |X| ≥
3, then there is no social welfare function f : Un −→ E that simultaneously satisfies
conditions U, WP, IIA, D, PI and ON.
Proof. On the previous Proposition 2.2 we saw that it is the same to deal with RU than
with R∗. We will prove the theorem for two individuals, i.e. |N | = 2. Let us consider
v ∈ R2, v = (v1, v2) as a point of reference. Our aim is to see that ∀w ∈ R2 it happens
vR∗w ⇐⇒ v1 > w1 – and so individual 1 is a dictator – or vR∗w ⇐⇒ v2 > w2 – and so
individual 2 is a dictator–.
Since we are in R2, we will draw it and divide the plane into four regions as shown in
Figure 2.1. For the moment, we do not consider the boundaries between the regions but
only the interior of the four regions.
Let w ∈ R2 be a point of the first region (Region I). Since w1 > v1 and w2 > v2, it will
be wR∗v. Similar reasoning happens with the third region (Region III), but in this case
it is vR∗w. Regions II and IV require a bit more effort. If w, w̄ ∈ R2, w in the second
region and w̄ in the fourth, we will prove that either wP ∗v ∧ vP ∗w̄ or vP ∗w ∧ w̄P ∗v.
Let us show first that all points in region II must be ranked equally against v (and
analogously all points in region IV must be ranked equally against v). Let z, z̄ be points
in II and let us assume zPv. As we are only using ordinal information, each of the
two persons is totally free to map his or her utility scale into another one by a strictly
increasing transformation without changing the rankings of the two persons. So we take
one for each that map z = (z1, z2) into z̄ = (z̄1, z̄2) and v into v. This means z̄P v. If
it were vPz instead of zPv, the same argument would hold. In case zIv, this would
lead to contradiction as, if we took z, z̄ in region II such that z1 < z̄1 and z2 < z̄2,
both indifferent to v, and used the argument above, it would happen zIz̄ and lead us to
contradiction. Therefore, all points in region II are ranked equally against v (obviously
they are not ranked equally against each other) and they are either strictly preferred or
strictly worse. Same happens with points in region IV and to prove it one must do an
analogous reasoning.







We now wish to show that points in region II are ranked oppositely to points in region
IV. We will use again the argument that strictly increasing transformations of utility
functions do not change the informational content. Let w = (w1, w2) be a point in region
II and suppose wPv. Consider the transformation of utility scale f(u) = u+(v1−w1) for
person 1. This means every point is moved w1 to the right. Consider the transformation
of utility scale g(u) = u+ (v2 −w2) for person 2. This means every point is moved down
w2. If we apply these transformations to the points we had, w moves to (w1 + v1 −
w1, w2 + v2 − w2) = (v1, v2) = v and v moves to (2v1 − w1, 2v2 − w2) := w. Note that
w is in the forth region, so these transformations map w into v and v into w. Since, by
assumption, wPv, it holds vPw. If it were vPw, a similar argument would hold. This
means points in regions II and IV are ranked against v contrary to each other. To recap,
if a point in region II is preferred to v, then all points in region II are preferred to v and
v is preferred to all points in region IV.
All that remains is dealing with the boundaries. If two regions are ranked equally
against v, then its boundary is ranked the same way as them. Suppose region II is
preferred to v and let w be a point on the boundary between regions I and II. There
always exists a point w in region II such that w1 < w1 and w2 < w2. Then wPw. As
wPv, we have wPv. Note that we have said nothing about the other boundaries. In the
following figures we will see they are not important for person 1 or 2 being a dictator.
All we have seen can be summed up in two different cases (see Figure 2.2):
(a) Region II is preferred to v (and v is preferred to region IV, and thus person 2 is a
dictator. In this case the boundaries between regions II and III, and regions I and IV
have no matter in the condition of dictatorship as its points are indifferent to person
2.
(b) Region IV is preferred to v (and v is preferred to region II, and thus person 1 is a
dictator. In this case the boundaries between regions II and I, and regions III and IV
have no matter in the condition of dictatorship as its points are indifferent to person












Up to now, all we have seen is that it is impossible to find a function that aggregates
individuals’ preferences and satisfies certain conditions. One may now ask if loosing
hypothesis could be of use. Let us remember which hypothesis did we suppose. First
we asked the preference relations to be rational. Then we asked f to be a social welfare
function. And then, we asked f to satisfy conditions U, IIA, WP and D. Finally, condition
ON was needed when we worked with utility functions. Sen (1977) [24] summarizes how
can such hypothesis be dropped or lowered and what do we get in each case:
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Majority rule under restricted domains
If we drop conditions related to the domain of the function f (we may either ask
R not to be transitive, or drop U, or look for ways of aggregating that are not social
welfare functions), the simple majority rule may be a function that satisfies some of our
conditions. Sen and Pattanaik (1969) [20], Inada (1969) [11] and Gaertner (2001) [9] go
deeper in this issue. Let us, for instance, restrict the preference ordering so that the
domain is only shaped by single-peaked preference. Let B(a, b, c) mean that alternative b
is between a and c in a strong ordering S. Single peaked preferences are defined this way:
Definition 2.3. A profile of individual preference relations (R1, . . . , Rn) satisfies the
condition of single-peakedness if there exists a strong ordering S such that for all i ∈ N ,
aRib and B(a, b, c) imply bP ic.
Theorem 2.3. Suppose the number of concerned voters is odd. The majority decision
rule is a social welfare function for any number of alternatives if the individual orderings
satisfy the property of single-peakedness over each triple of alternatives.
Reverse dictatorship and null social welfare functions
We say that a social welfare function is a reverse dictatorship is −f is a dictatorship.
We say that it is null if all alternatives are indifferent to each other. Pareto conditions
may seem the most obvious condition. It cannot be loosened in an intuitive way and, if
we drop it, instead of getting a dictatorship, we may get either a dictatorship, a reverse
dictatorship or a null social welfare function. Wilson (1972) [27] and Binmore (1976) [2]
give proofs of when to get one or another. For a more detailed version of what they prove,
see Ubeda (2004) [26].
The Borda Rule
The Borda Rule has been widely discussed and many interpretations and variations
have come up. Sen (1977) [23] considers two variants of the Borda rule. The broad Borda
Rule (BBR) checks the rank of all alternatives in the set X in a person’s ordering and the
scores are given as (n+ 1− j). The narrow Borda Rule (NBR) is a choice function that
gives the Borda scores according to rankings of the set S for a choice over S. Sen also sets
a condition named α that gives certain consistency to the choice rule.
Definition 2.4. A Choice Rule satisfies condition α if for all S ⊆ T ⊆ X, if an alternative
a belongs to S and to C(T ), then it also belongs to C(S).
The NBR satisfies condition IIA but it does not satisfy property α. However, the BBR
may not satisiy independence of irrelevant alternatives but it satisfies condition α, so that
it generates a rational preference relation.
Other impossibility theorems
To finish, let us point out that Arrow’s impossibility theorem is not the only impos-
sibility theorem in social choice theory. There are others that have provoked disbelief
like the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem or the Sen’s impossibility theorem of a Paretian
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liberal (1970). To formulate the first one would go way out the aims of this work, but the
second one can be formulated. To do so we have first to define condition of liberalism.
Informally, we could say that a function f satisfies liberalism if for each individual i, there
is at least one pair of personal alternatives (a, b) ∈ X such that the individual is decisive
both ways in the social choice process. Liberalism will be denoted by L.




Any society has different forms to assign benefits and duties, and it is of the extreme
importance to see how this is done across the members of the society. It is the result
of some economic, social or political frameworks. They are changing over time and are
the result of historical processes. They affect people’s lives. This is the topic of what
is known as distributive justice, and we will see it through the eyes of formal reasoning
(mathematical in nature), which implies also a moral guidance for the assessment of
political processes or structures, giving the distribution of benefits and duties.
This chapter delves into the use of utility functions and its utility information to find
social welfare functions. Last chapter we saw a version of Arrow’s theorem in terms of
utility functions. Remember it was imperative not to compare utilities between individ-
uals neither of utility levels nor gains or losses. All that mattered was the position an
alternative had against another, so that no mattered which utility function we used as
long as it represented the preference ordering of every individual. This chapter shows,
though, how being able to compare utilities may change the outlook of the problem.
We will mainly follow Blackorby et al.(1984) [3], D’Aspremont and Gevers (1977) [4] and
Hammond (1976) [10]. We use their papers and make some adaptations to our framework.
3.1 Informational Structure and Axioms
Statements like “for individual i, a is preferred to b” were the ones we made in the
previous chapter, so we supposed every individual was able to compare alternatives in
twos and our aim was to find a function that gave us a preference ordering for these
alternatives. However, in this chapter, we want to compare between individuals, so we
want to make statements like “it is better alternative a for individual i than alternative
b is for individual j”. Therefore, to consider a preference ordering for every individual
is not sufficient and, instead, we will consider a preference ordering on the set X × N
and want to find a mapping f from the set of possible orderings on X ×N to the set of
orderings on alternatives X, something called E in the previous chapter.
To differentiate both relations, we will call R̃ to the relation defined on X×N and R to
the relation defined on X. Although not always needed, we will suppose R̃ is continuous,
so that it can be represented by an utility function. We will call R the set of all possible
relations defined on X × N . Note that this relation is a generalization from the one on
the previous chapter, as aRib = (a, i)R̃(b, i). Also, we may want to refer to the fact that,
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given an alternative a, individual i gets more benefit that individual j. We will denote
this by iR̃(a)j := (a, i)R̃(a, j).
When working with utility functions function f must be redefined. Let O be the set of
all possible utility functions representing a preference relation on X×N . A social welfare
function f can be interpreted both as a mapping fromO to the set of all possible preference
orderings on X, E and as a mapping from Un to E . Both ways U = (u(·, 1), . . . , u(·, n))
will denote a profile of utility functions.
For the next few pages our aim will be to define a whole setup that will allow us to
find certain welfare social functions. As said, from now on, the preference ordering R̃ will
be a transitive, complete and continuous binary relation defined on X ×N .
Let us first define which informational requirements may be asked. Informational
requirements denote whether it is possible or not to compare between individuals, how
these comparisons can be made and if we can use cardinal informal or only ordinal. We
will define them in terms of utility functions since some of them can only be defined this
way.
Condition (ON - Ordinal Measure, Non-comparable Utilities). Let U1, U2 be two
profiles of utility functions. Let, for every i, φi be a strictly increasing transformation. If
∀i ∈ N and ∀a ∈ X it holds u2(a, i) = φi(u1(a, i)), then RU1 = RU2. Note that u1(·, i)
and u2(·, i) are the utility components of profiles U1 and U2 respectively.
Condition ON is the same it was in Chapter 2, though adapting the notation. It means
that no matter which number an individual ascribes to an alternative, provided that its
ordinal position in comparison to other alternatives does not change. This means we
cannot compare utilities and that all that matters is the ordinal position of an alternative.
When we permit comparison between utilities we may ask the following informational
requirement.
Condition (OC - Ordinal Measure, Fully-comparable utilities). Let U1, U2 be two
profiles of utility functions. Let φ be a strictly increasing transformation. If ∀i ∈ N and
∀a ∈ X it holds u2(a, i) = φ(u1(a, i)), then RU1 = RU2.
In this case, as we want to compare, we have to use an utility transformation such
that keeps orderings in the same way as before. No matter which number one ascribes
to an alternative provided that its ordinal position in comparison to other alternatives
and to other individuals does not change. Note that in both cases we do not use cardinal
information, only ordinal. This means it is not necessary to use utility functions, it is
enough with preference orderings. Note that, when we suppose R̃ to be defined in X×N ,
we are already permitting comparisons between individuals, so all we are saying in OC is
that utility transformations are allowed. In case ON, we suppose there are n preference
orderings defined on X and we are allowing each of them to use utility transformations if
needed.
When we want to use cardinal measure, we have to establish an origin point and a
scale. In case every individual has its own origin point and scale we will not be able to
compare utilities.
Condition (CN - Cardinal Measure, Non-comparable utilities). Let U1, U2 be two
profiles of utility functions. Let there be 2n numbers α1, . . . , αn and β1 > 0, . . . , βn > 0.
If ∀i ∈ N and ∀a ∈ X it holds u2(a, i) = αi + βi · u1(a, i), then RU1 = RU2.
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When we require all αi to be the same and all βi to be the same, we will be able to
compare between individuals.
Condition (CC - Cardinal Measure, Fully-comparable utilities). Let U1, U2 be
two profiles of utility functions. Let there be α and β > 0. If ∀i ∈ N and ∀a ∈ X it holds
u2(a, i) = α+ β · u1(a, i), then RU1 = RU2.
Between CN and CC we shall single out two interesting cases. One may ask only to
be either all αi the same or all βi the same. In the first case, they all have the same origin
point but different scale measure, so that we can compare utility levels. Otherwise, when
βi are all the same, they have the same scale measure but different origin point. This
allows us to compare gains and loses but no utility levels.
Condition (CUL - Cardinal Measure, Utility-Levels-comparable utilities). Let
U1, U2 be two profiles of utility functions. Let there be n + 1 numbers α and β
1 >
0, . . . , βn > 0. If ∀i ∈ N and ∀a ∈ X it holds u2(a, i) = α+ βi · u1(a, i), then RU1 = RU2.
Condition (CIC - Cardinal Measure, Increment-comparable utilities). Let U1, U2
be two profiles of utility functions. Let there be n + 1 numbers α1, . . . , αn and β > 0. If
∀i ∈ N and ∀a ∈ X it holds u2(a, i) = αi + β · u1(a, i), then RU1 = RU2.
The following table sums up all possible informational requirements.
Non-comparable Half-comparable Full-comparable
Ordinal Measure ON . . . OC
Cardinal Measure CN CUL and CIC CC
Notice that, despite OC only allows us to compare utility levels it has been put as full-
comparable. This is due to in ordinal informational requirement we cannot compare gains
and losses since this would need the use of cardinal numbers. We have six different possible
informational requirements. The following theorems show that, given our framework,
some of them are equivalent.
Theorem 3.1. A social welfare function f satisfying U satisfies CN if and only if it
satisfies CUL.
Proof. Taking α1 = · · · = αn = α, it holds directly that CN imply CUL.
We have only to see, then, that CUL implies CN. Let U0 ∈ Un be a profile of utility
functions. Let there be 2n numbers α1, . . . , αn and β1 > 0, . . . , βn > 0. Suppose there
exists a profile of utilities U1 such that ∀a ∈ X,∀i ∈ N , u1(a, i) = αi + βi · u0(a, i). We
must show that if f satisfies CUL, then RU0 = RU1 .
Consider a profiles of utilities U2 such that ∀i ∈ N and ∀a ∈ X it is u2(a, i) =
1 + β̄i · u0(a, i), where β̄i are such that there exists θ < minj∈N αj with:
1
β̄i
= (αi − θ) 1
βi
Because of CUL, we have RU2 = RU0 . Note that we can isolate u0(a, i) and write u0(a, i) =
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1
β̄i
(u2(a, i)− 1). Then,
u1(a, i) = α
i + βi · u0(a, i)
= αi + βi · 1
β̄i
(u2(a, i)− 1)
= αi + (αi − θ)(u2(a, i)− 1)
= θ + (αi − θ) · u2(a, i)
This, by CUL, means RU1 = RU2 , therefore RU0 = RU1 .
When independence of irrelevant alternatives hold, as long as comparability between
individuals is not allowed, it is the same using either ordinal or cardinal information.
D’Aspremont and Gevers (1977) [4] give a proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. A social welfare function satisfying IIA satisfies CN if and only if satisfies
ON.
So, by Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, our initial six possible informational requirements have
turned into four. Condition ON is the most restrictive and was the one used in Chapter
2 in Arrow’s framework. This chapter will study deeply informational requirements OC
and CIC.
First, though, let us introduce some new conditions of justice. The conditions proposed
by Arrow were minimal conditions of justice that every way of choosing shall satisfy.
Now that we have changed Arrow’s framework, we may introduce some new ones and
strengthen some of them. As we will work with both, utility functions and binary relations,
conditions will be defined in terms of both utility functions and binary reltions.
Condition (A - Anonymity). In terms of preference orderings: Let R̃ and R̃′ be two
orderings on X ×N and σ a permutation on N such that R′ = σ(R). Then, R′ = R.
In terms of utility functions: Let σ be a permutation on the set of individuals N and
a ∈ X. Let U1, U2 ∈ Un be two profiles of utility functions. If ∀i ∈ N and ∀a ∈ X it holds
u1(a, i) = u2(a, σ(i)), then RU1 = RU2.
Anonymity requires that, in social decision making, every individual should count the
same. Renumbering the individuals or changing their name-tags should not matter or,
more technically, permutations among the set of voters should play no role in the social
decision procedure. Notice that, if Anonymity holds, it implies that there is no dictator,
so it is a strengthening of condition D.
Suppes (1966) [25] proposed another condition of justice. He said that if permuting
individuals leaves everybody just as well off as before, then two social states are socially
indifferent.
Condition (S - Suppes notion of justice). In terms of preference orderings: Let
a, b ∈ X. If there exists a permutation σ on N such that ∀i ∈ N it holds (a, i)Ĩ(b, σ(i)),
then aIb.
In terms of utility functions: Let a, b ∈ X. If there exists a permutation σ on N such that
∀i ∈ N it holds u(a, i) = u(b, σ(i)), then aIb.
Let us now introduce another Pareto condition, stronger than the others defined before.
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Condition (SP - Strict Pareto Principle). In terms of preference orderings: Let
a, b ∈ X and R̃ be an ordering in X × N such that ∀i ∈ N it holds (a, i)R̃(b, i). Then,
aRb. If, additionally, ∃j ∈ N such that (a, j)P (b, j), then aPb.
In terms of utility functions: Let a, b ∈ X and U be a profile of utility functions such
that ∀i ∈ N it holds u(a, i) ≥ u(b, i). Then, aRb. If, moreover, ∃j ∈ N such that
u(a, j) > u(b, j), then aPb.
Note that SP is a stronger version of the weak Pareto principle and also of the Pareto
Indifference principle. This means whenever SP is held, WP and PI also hold.
Condition IIA can be defined in the same way as in Chapter 2 since aRib = (a, i)R̃(b, i).
Unrestricted domain can is also the same as before. Strong neutrality will be needed to
show some results, so it must be redefined in terms of preference relations.
Condition (SN - Strong Neutrality). Let R̃ and R̃′ be two preference orderings in
X×N and a, b, c, d ∈ X. Suppose that ∀i ∈ N it holds (a, i)R̃(b, i) and (c, i)R̃′(d, i). Then
aRb⇐⇒ cR′d.
We shall now introduce the notion of concerned and unconcerned voters. Concerned
voters are those who are not indifferent for at least a pair of alternatives. Unconcerned
voters are those who are indifferent between every two alternatives. Separability require-
ment eliminates all unconcerned individuals.
Condition (SE - Separability of unconcerned individuals). Let U1, U2 be two
profiles of utility functions. Let us consider M ⊂ N . If ∀i ∈ M and ∀a ∈ X it
holds u1(a, i) = u2(a, i) while ∀j /∈ M and ∀a, b ∈ X it holds u1(a, j) = u1(b, j) and
u2(a, j) = u2(b, j), then RU1 = RU2.
The set N \M is the set of unconcerned individuals. As SE will only be used in terms
of utilities, it is only defined this way. Finally, two more conditions shall be defined. They
respond to the necessity of favouring an individual or another when one of them is better
off than the other.
Condition (EQ - Equity). In terms of preference orderings: Let a, b ∈ X be a pair of
alternatives, i, j ∈ N two individuals and R̃ an ordering on X × N . If jP̃ (a)i, jP̃ (b)i,
aP ib, bP ja and ∀k ∈ N \ {i, j} aIkb, then aPb.
In terms of utility functions: Let U be a profile of utility functions. Let a, b ∈ X be two
alternatives and let i, j ∈ N be two individuals. If ∀h ∈ N \{i, j} it holds u(a, h) = u(b, h)
and u(b, i) < u(a, i) < u(a, j) < u(b, j), then aPUb.
Condition (INEQ - Inequity). Let U ∈ Un be a profile of utility functions. Let
a, b ∈ X be two alternatives and let i, j ∈ N be two individuals. If ∀h ∈ N \ {i, j} it holds
u(a, h) = u(b, h) and u(b, i) < u(a, i) < u(a, j) < u(b, j), then bPUa.
Clearly, Equity and Inequity can only be defined when interpersonal comparison is
allowed. Equity favours the worst off individual while Inequity favours the better off one.
Under conditions U and IIA, conditions A and S are equivalent. This property will
be of pretty use when later characterizing the Leximin Principle. The following lemma
and propositions show this result.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose |X| ≥ 3 and f is a social welfare function satisfying U, IIA and S.
Let a, b ∈ X be two alternatives, R̃ and R̃′ two orderings in X ×N and σ a permutation
on N such that
∀i, j ∈ N (a, i)R̃(b, j)⇐⇒ (a, i)R̃′(b, σ(j)),
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∀i, j ∈ N (b, j)R̃(a, i)⇐⇒ (b, σ(j))R̃′(a, i).
Then, aRb⇐⇒ aR′b and bRa⇐⇒ bR′a.
Proof. Let c ∈ X \ {a, b} be an alternative. We can consider orderings R̃0 and R̃′0 such
that
(i) R̃ = R̃0 in {a, b},
(ii) R̃′ = R̃′0 in {a, b},
(iii) ∀i ∈ N it holds (b, i)Ĩ0(c, i),
(iv) ∀i ∈ N it holds (b, σ(i))Ĩ ′0(c, i).





(a, i)R̃0(c, j)⇐⇒ (a, i)R̃0(b, j) by (iii),
⇐⇒ (a, i)R̃(b, j) by (i),
⇐⇒ (a, i)R̃′(b, σ(j)) by hypothesis,
⇐⇒ (a, i)R̃′0(b, σ(j)) by (ii),
⇐⇒ (a, i)R̃′0(c, j) by (iv).
Similarly, (c, j)R̃0(a, i) ⇐⇒ (c, j)R̃′0(a, i). This means R̃0 = R̃′0 in {a, c}. By IIA, we
have R0 = R
′
0 in {a, c}. By (i), (ii) and IIA, we have R = R0 in {a, b} and R′ = R′0 in
{a, b}. By S, (iii) and (iv), we have bI0c and bI ′0c. Finally, aRb⇐⇒ aR0b⇐⇒ aR0c⇐⇒
aR′0c⇐⇒ aR′0b⇐⇒ aR′b.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose |X| ≥ 3 and f is a social welfare function satisfying U, IIA
and S. Then f also satisfies A.
Proof. Suppose that f satisfies S. We will first construct two ordering that satisfy hy-
pothesis of the previous lemma and we will be able to apply it. The construction is quite
similar to the proof above. Let R̃ and R̃′ be two orderings in X × N and let σ be a
permutation such that R̃′ = σ(R̃). This means (a, i)σ(R̃)(b, j) is (a, σ(i))R̃(b, σ(j)). Let
us consider a, b ∈ X. Let c ∈ X \ {a, b} be an alternative. We can consider orderings R̃0
and R̃′0 such that
(i) R̃ = R̃0 in {a, b},
(ii) R̃′ = R̃′0 in {a, b},
(iii) ∀i ∈ N it holds (b, i)Ĩ0(c, i),
(iv) ∀i ∈ N it holds (b, σ(i))Ĩ ′0(c, i).





(a, i)R̃0(c, j)⇐⇒ (a, i)R̃0(b, j) by (iii),
⇐⇒ (a, i)R̃(b, j) by (i),
⇐⇒ (a, σ(i))R̃′(b, σ(j)) by hypothesis,
⇐⇒ (a, σ(i))R̃′0(b, σ(j)) by (ii),
⇐⇒ (a, σ(i))R̃′0(c, j) by (iv).
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Similarly, (c, j)R̃0(a, i) ⇐⇒ (c, σ(j))R̃′0(a, i). Now, R̃0 and R̃′0 are ordering satisfying
the conditions on the previous lemma, so we have R̃0 = R̃′0 in {a, c}. But by (iii), (iv)
and condition S, we have bĨ0c and bĨ ′0c, so that R0 = R
′
0 in {a, b}. But by (i), (ii) and
condition IIA, it follows R = R′ in {a, b}. As a, b can be any alternatives, condition A is
satisfied.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose |X| ≥ 3 and f is a social welfare function satisfying U, IIA,
SP and A. Then f also satisfies S.
Proof. Let f be a social welfare function satisfying U, IIA, SP and A. Let R̃ be an ordering
on X×N and σ a permutation of N of only two individuals i and j, i.e., σ(i) = j, σ(j) = i
and ∀k 6= i, j, σ(k) = k. Suppose that for all l ∈ N it holds (a, l)Ĩ(b, σ(l)). Our aim is to
show aIb.
Suppose it does not hold aIb and, instead, we have aPb. Let us construct two orderings
R̃′ and R̃′′ satisfying the following conditions:
(i) (a, i)P̃ ′(b, i) and (a, i)P̃ ′(a, j),
(ii) (b, j)P̃ ′(a, j) and (b, j)P̃ ′(b, i),
(iii) (a, i)Ĩ ′(b, j) and (b, i)Ĩ ′(a, j),
(iv) (a, j)P̃ ′′(b, j) and (a, j)P̃ ′′(a, i),
(v) (b, i)P̃ ′′(a, i) and (b, i)P̃ ′′(b, j),
(vi) (a, i)Ĩ ′′(b, j), and (b, i)Ĩ ′′(a, j).
Due to aPb, condition (iii) and IIA it holds aP ′b. Note that R′′ = σ(R′). From Anonymity
it follows aP ′′b. But, as IIA and SP hold, SN follows. And taking a = c and b = d we
fathom bP ′a, which leads us to contradiction. If it were bPa an analogous argument
would be followed.
Now we move to general permutations. As SN is satisfied, we can consider the ordering
R∗ on Rn associated with f shown on Proposition 2.2. Thus, we can consider alternatives
as vectors in Rn. Let u, v ∈ Rn be the same except for an exchange of elements between
two columns. We have just shown uIv. Since N is a finite set, any permutations of ele-
ments of a vector may be a product of, at most, n permutations involving only 2 columns.
Indifference is preserved along the sequence, so a and b must be socially indifferent.
D’Aspremont and Gevers (1977) show that with the ordering on Rn associated to a
social welfare function f , which was defined in Proposition 2.2, the following results are
achieved.
Proposition 3.3. The ordering R∗ satisfies SP if f satisfies IIA and SP. If f also satisfies
OC (respectively CIC, A), then R∗ satisfies OC (respectively (CIC, A).
Proposition 3.4. If f satisfies IIA and SP, then the ordering R∗ satisfies SE (respectively
EQ, INEQ) if, and only if, f satisfies SE (respectively EQ,INEQ).
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3.2 The Rawlsian form
Rawls (1971) developed his concept of justice as fairness proposing two principles of
justice which are meant to be guidelines for how the basic structure of society is to realize
the values of liberty and equality. It is probably fair to say that Rawls’s work has become
a powerful contestant of utilitarianism over the last few decades. Rawls’s second principle,
the difference principle, on which economists have focused in particular and on which we
will focus, requires that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they
are both to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society and attaches
to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.
In terms of binary relations, Rawls’s difference principle, or maximin rule, denoted by
PD can be defined as follows. Given an individual i ∈ N and two alternatives a, b ∈ X :
aPDb iff
(




∀j ∈ N (a, j)P̃ (b, i)
)
.
Here, individual i is worst off in state b; aPDb if, and only if, everybody is better off in
state a than i is in state b. Later on, we will define Rawls’s difference principle in terms
of utility functions.
It is easy to see that PD is irreflexive and asymmetric. If RD the preference relation
associated, one may prove it is an ordering. Given any ordering R̃, we define the ordering
RD = fD(R̃), so that fD is a social welfare functions. It can be proved easily by its
definition that conditions U, IIA and S are satisfied. Then, fD also satisfies A. WP is
also satisfied, but not SP. We prove next that fD also satisfies EQ.
Proposition 3.5. fD satisfies condition EQ.
Proof. Suppose iP (a)j, iP (b)j, aP ib, bP ja and that ∀k ∈ N \ {i, j} we have aIkb. Let
l ∈ N be an individual so that ∀k ∈ N it holds (a, k)R̃(a, l). Obviously individual l can
not be individual j. Then, (a, l)R̃(b, l). It is false then, that ∀k ∈ N (b, k)P̃ (a, l). As
the premise of the maximin rule is true and the consequent is false, it is false that bPDa,
from what follows aRDb and condition EQ is satisfied.
We will now strengthen the difference principle and replace it by Sen’s lexical difference
principle. The idea is to rank individuals from more advantaged to less. We will apply
the maximin rule from the less advantaged to the most until it is decided whether aPb or
bPa.
Let us, then, give each individual i ∈ N a rank for each social state, r(i, a), so that for
every alternative a every person is assigned an integer between 1 and n. The individuals
who are less advantaged have smaller numbers than those who are more advantaged. The
individuals with smaller numbers will receive greater precedence than those who are more
advantaged. Formally, for every alternative a ∈ X and every person i ∈ N , we define en
integer between 1 and n such that (a, i)P̃ (a, j)⇐⇒ r(i, a) > r(j, a). If there are ties, i.e.
(a, i)Ĩ(a, j), we will see that they can be broken without affecting the final social ordering.
In any social state a ∈ X for each integer r there exists a unique individual i ∈ N whose
rank is r, and it will be denoted by i(r, a). We will write ar to the pair (a, i(r, a)). With
this notation we have, for 1 ≤ r ≤ n − 1, ar+1R̃ar. With this notation we can easily
redefine the maximin rule in this way: aPDb⇐⇒ a1P̃ b1.
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We can now define the lexical difference principle or leximin, PL. Let a, b ∈ X be
alternatives:
aPLb ⇐⇒ ∃m ≥ 1 | ∀r ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}; ar Ĩbr ∧ amP̃ bm.
Then, if RL is the corresponding preference relation and IL the corresponding indifference
relation, we have aILb⇐⇒ ar Ĩbr ∀r ∈ N . RL is transitive and complete and, if fL is the
corresponding social welfare function, RL = fL(R̃) satisfies conditions U, IIA, S (and so,
A) by definition. One may see it is a strengthening of the difference principle. fL also
satisfies SP and EQ. To prove this we need some auxiliary lemmas. Let N(k) = {1, . . . , k}
denote the set of integers from 1 to k.
Lemma 3.2. Let σ be a permutation on N and r ∈ N . If k ∈ N is such that r > k ≥ σ(r)
then there exists s ≤ k such that σ(s) > k.





⊆ N(k). But N(k) ∪ {r} has k + 1 members while N(k) has k members.
Therefore, we reach a contradiction since σ cannot be a permutation.
Lemma 3.3. Let σ be a permutation on N and a, b ∈ X. If, for any m ∈ {1, . . . , n} we
have arR̃bσ(r) with 1 ≤ r ≤ m, then arR̃br (with 1 ≤ r ≤ m).
Proof. For any r ∈ {1, . . . ,m} if can be either (i) σ(r) ≥ r or (ii) σ(r) < r. In the first
case (i) it holds yσ(r)R̃yr for all y ∈ X and, by transitivity with the hypothesis we have
arR̃br. In case (ii), we take k = r− 1. Because of Lemma 3.2 there exists s ≤ k such that
σ(s) > k. Then, we have arR̃as, asR̃bσ(s), bσ(s)R̃bσ(r) and, by transitivity, arR̃bσ(r)
Lemma 3.4. Let σ be a permutation on N and a, b ∈ X. If, for any m ∈ {1, . . . , n} it
holds br Ĩar and arR̃bσ(r) with 1 ≤ r ≤ m, then ar Ĩbσ(r).
Proof. It is enough for us to show bσ(r)R̃br. Suppose it does not hold, i.e. brP̃ bσ(r).
Then there exists an integer k such that r > k ≥ σ(r) and bk+1P̃ bk. Using Lemma 3.2
there exists s ≤ k such that σ(s) > k. It follows, then, σ(s) ≥ k + 1 and we arrive to
contradiction using transitivity in bk+1P̃ bk, bkR̃bs, bsR̃bσ(s) and bσ(s)R̃bk+1.
Lemma 3.5. Let a, b ∈ X and j ∈ N. If (a, j)P̃ (b, j) and it holds
∀k ∈ N (b, k)P̃ (a, k)⇒ (a, k)P̃ (a, j).
Then, aPLb.
Proof. Let us consider a permutation σ in N such that ∀i ∈ N it holds σ(r(i, a)) = r(i, b).
Let s = r(j, a). Then σ(s) = r(j, b) and asP̃ bσ(s). Let also k ∈ N be an alternative
and name t = r(k, a), so that σ(t) = r(k, b). Then bσ(t)P̃ at ⇒ atP̃ as. This means
bσ(t)P̃ at ⇒ t > s. So, for 1 ≤ t ≤ s we have atR̃bσ(t). Because of Lemma 3.3 we have
atR̃bt for 1 ≤ t ≤ s.
Suppose now that for those t it holds atĨbt. Since it also holds atR̃bσ(t), by Lemma
3.4 we have atĨbσ(t) (1 ≤ t ≤ s). This contradicts asP̃ bσ(s). Therefore, there exists a t,
1 ≤ m ≤ s such that amP̃ bm while for other t, 1 ≤ t ≤ s it is atR̃bt, and by definition of
leximin, it follows aPLb.
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Proposition 3.6. fL satisfies conditions SP and EQ.
Proof. Let a, b ∈ X be alternatives. To prove SP suppose that ∀i ∈ N it holds (a, i)R̃(b, i)
and there exists at least one j ∈ N such that (a, j)P̃ (b, j). In this case, hypothesis of
Lemma 3.5 are satisfied, so we have aPLb.
To show condition EQ suppose now (a, j)P̃ (a, i), (b, j)P̃ (b, i), (a, i)P̃ (b, i), (b, j)P̃ (a, j)
and ∀k ∈ N \ {i, j} (a, k)Ĩ(b, k). In this case hypothesis of Lemma 3.5 are also satisfied,
so aPLb.
Conversely, fL is the only social welfare function satisfying U, IIA, A, SP and EQ.
This leads to a characterization of the leximin principle. To prove it, we also need a
previous lemma. In it, let a, b ∈ X and we use the notation aP (J)b, where:
(i) J = {j ∈ N | (b, j)P̃ (a, j)},
(ii) ∃i ∈ N such that (a, i)P̃ (b, i),
(iii) ∀j ∈ J it holds (a, j)P̃ (b, i).
Lemma 3.6. Suppose that X has at least three alternatives, |X| ≥ 3, and that f is a
social welfare function satisfying U, IIA, EQ and SP. Then, for any a, b ∈ X and for any
set J ⊆ N , aP (J)b implies aPb.
Proof. As N is a finite set, we may prove it by induction on the number of individuals
on J . If J is empty, then everyone satisfies prefers a to b and there exists at least one
individual who strictly prefers a to b. This means aPb by SP.
Let us fix two alternatives a, b ∈ X. Suppose Jm−1 is a non-empty set of m − 1
individuals for which, for any ordering R̃0 in X × N , aP (Jm−1)b implies aPb. Let now
Jm = Jm−1 ∪ {k} be a non-empty set of m individuals for which it holds aP (Jm)b. We
want to show aPb. Let c be an alternative in X\{a, b}. We want to construct the ordering
R̃0 so that aPb is followed from aP (Jm)b. Let R̃0 be an ordering that satisfies:
(iv) aR̃0b⇐⇒ aR̃b,
(v) ∀j ∈ J, (a, j)P̃0(c, i),
(vi) (a, i)P̃0(c, i) ∧ (c, i)P̃0(b, i),
(vii) (a, k)Ĩ0(c, k),
(viii) ∀j ∈ N \ {i, k}, (b, j)Ĩ0(c, j).
This ordering exists and by U we can consider the social welfare function f(R̃0) = R0.
The proof will proceed in two steps:
Step 1 aP0c. This will be proved by showing that aP (Jm−1)c and using the induction
hypothesis. Note that by (vi) we have (a, i)P̃0(c, i). From (v) it follows ∀j ∈
Jm−1 (a, j)P̃0(c, i). Also, Jm−1 = {j ∈ N | (c, j)P̃0(a, j)}. This is because
(c, j)P̃0(a, j)⇐⇒ (b, j)P̃0(a, j) and j ∈ N \ {i, k} by (vi), (vii) and (viii),
⇐⇒ (b, j)P̃ (a, j) and j ∈ N \ {i, k} by (iv),
⇐⇒ j ∈ Jm−1 by (i), (ii) and the definition of Jm−1.
As (i), (ii) and (iii) are satisfied, we have aP (Jm−1)c, and thus aP0c.
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Step 2 cR0b. This will be proved using EQ. By (vi) we have (c, i)P̃0(b, i) (α). By (viii)
it holds ∀j ∈ N \ {i, k}, (b, j)Ĩ0(c, j) (β). By definition, we have k ∈ Jm, so by
(i) we have (b, k)P̃ (a, k). Using (iv), (b, k)P̃0(a, k), and because of (vii) it holds
(b, k)P̃0(c, k) (γ). Also, using (v) and that k ∈ Jm, (a, k)P̃0(c, i) holds. From (vii)
it follows (c, k)P̃0(c, i) (δ). Finally, using again k ∈ Jm, (i) and (iii), it follows
(b, k)P̃0(b, i) (ε). Note that α, β, γ, δ, ε are the premises of condition E, so we can
conclude cR0b.
As R0 is transitive, we have aP0b. Since condition IIA holds and (iv), we obtain aPb, as
required.
Theorem 3.3 (Leximin’s characterization). If |X| ≥ 3, fL is the only social welfare
function satisfying U, IIA, S, SP and EQ.
Proof. We have seen above that if the social welfare function is the leximin principle, then
it satisfies conditions U, IIA, SP, EQ and S. It only lasts, then, to show the reciprocal.
Let f be a social welfare function satisfying U, IIA, SP, E and S. We want to see that
f is fL, i.e. given two alternatives a, b ∈ X, we want to see RL and R rank them in the
same way.
Suppose aILb.
This means ar Ĩbr for 1 ≤ r ≤ n. Let us consider a permutation σ on N such that ∀i ∈ N
it holds r(i, a) = r(σ(i), b). This means (a, i)Ĩ(b, σ(i)) and, from condition S, it follows
aIb.
Suppose now aPLb.
This means there exists an m ∈ N such that amP̃ bm and ar Ĩbr ∀r ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}.
Let c ∈ X \ {a, b}. Let us construct an ordering R̃0 on X × N such that br Ĩ0(c, i(r, a))
for 1 ≤ r ≤ n and also it ranks a against b the same way as R̃ does i.e. aR̃b ⇐⇒
aR̃b ∧ bR̃a ⇐⇒ bR̃a. It is clear that this ordering exists. By U we can define R0 =
f(R̃0). Note that r(i, a) = r(σ(i), b) is the same as i(r, a) = σ(i(r, b)), so we can write
(b, i(r, b))Ĩ0(c, σ(i(r, b))) and, because of S, we have bI0c. See that if it were aP0c, we
would have aP0b and by condition IIA, aPb would follow as required.
Let us then prove that aP0c holds. We will prove it using Lemma 3.6. Let J = {j ∈
N | (c, j)P̃0(a, j)}. As amP̃ bm and by definition of the ordering R̃0, we have amP̃0bm.
Also, by definition of R̃0 we can write amP̃0(c, i(m, a)). So taking k = i(m, a), there exists
k ∈ N such that (a, k)P̃0(c, k). It is only left to show (c, j)P̃0(a, j) implies (a, j)P̃0(c, k).
Suppose (c, j)P̃0(a, j). Let r = i(r, a). By construction of the ordering R̃0, we have
br Ĩ0(c, j). This implies brP̃0(a, j) and so brP̃0ar. As R̃ and R̃0 are identically defined for
a against b, it holds brP̃ ar. It has to be, then, r > m. In this case, arR̃0am. But, as
k = i(m, a), amP̃0(c, k). Then, by definition of r, we finally have (a, j)P̃0(c, k).
This means the hypothesis of the lemma are satisfied and aP0c holds, so aPb follows.
We have characterized the leximin principle with conditions U, IIA, SP, S and EQ.
As conditions IIA and SP hold together, S and A are equivalent. This means we can also
characterize the leximin principle with condition A instead of S. Notice that the leximin
principle can be understood as a dictatorship of the worst-off individuals and this may
seem to contradict Anonymity (or non-dictatorship). There is, though, a slight difference
between this dictatorship and the one defined in Chapter 2. This one is called positional
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dictatorship. In Chapter 2, given a profile of preference orderings (R1, . . . , Rn). there was
an individual k who was a dictator. If we changed the profile, the new individual k would
be the dictator. However, with the positional dictatorship, it is the individual with rank
k who is the dictator (and is does not matter if it is individual 1, k or n). If we changed
the profile of preference relations, the dictator would still be the person with rank k but
it may have changed his or her position (if it were individual k, now it may be individual
l).
We can also define a symmetric social welfare function but, instead of favouring the
worst off individuals, we may favour the better off ones. We will call it the leximax
principle. Symmetrically, the leximax principle is characterized by U, IIA, SP, A and
INEQ.
D’Aspremont and Gevers (1977) give another characterization of the leximin principle.
Equity may seem quite a strong condition, mostly when interests of the worst off individual
become on conflict with all the more favoured members of society. Moreover, in Theorem
3.3, the characterization of leximin, condition SE is absent and one may want it to
appear. They proved that setting few conditions of justice, the social welfare function
leads us either to Equity or Inequity. To prove it we will have to set-up all conditions
and social welfare functions in terms of utilities. All needed conditions have been defined
in terms of utility functions above. We will first need a lemma essentially technical to
prove the result. Recall that, if condition SN is satisfied (which is due to IIA and SP),
we can consider every alternative as a vector in an n-dimensional Euclidean space. We
also define the rank function r in terms of utility as follows: given a vector u ∈ Rn,
ur(i) < ur(j) ⇐⇒ r(i) < r(j).
Lemma 3.7. If f satisfies U, IIA, SP, A, SE and the informational requirement OC,
then ∀i, j ∈ N with r(i) < r(j) and ∀u, v ∈ Rn such that vr(i) < ur(i) < ur(j) < vr(j) and
vr(k) = ur(k) for every k ∈ N \ {i, j} it holds either uP ∗v or vP ∗u.
Proof. Let u0, u1, v0, v1 ∈ Rn be vectors satisfying the conditions of the lemma. As R∗ is





by Propositions 2.2, 3.3 and 3.4 that the ordering R∗ inherits the properties of f . Because




























Since conditions A and OC hold, u2P
∗v2 holds. By conditions A and SE, u2P
∗v2 implies
u1P
∗v1. This means u0P
∗v0 implies u1P
∗v1.





∗u1. Because of Anonymity and Separability of unconcerned individuals, if this result
holds for some i, j ∈ N with r(i) < r(j), it is also true for all k, h ∈ N with r(k) < r(n).
It remains to prove, however that the case u0I
∗v0 is impossible. Let us suppose it is





0 ∀k ∈ N \ {k}.
Following the same argument as before, we get cI∗v0. By transitivity, cI
∗u0, but this
contradicts condition SP.
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Theorem 3.4. If f satisfies U, IIA, SP, A, the informational requirement OC and SE,
then it either satisfies EQ or INEQ.
Proof. Consider any i, j ∈ N and let u, v ∈ Rn such that
vr(i) < ur(i) < ur(j) < vr(j) and ur(k) = vr(k) ∀k ∈ N \ {i, j}.


















0 = β < v
r(i) for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}.
Note that u0 and v0 satisfy the conditions of the previous lemma. As SE holds, we
have uR∗v if, and only if, u0R
∗v0, and vR
∗u iff v0R
∗u0, and we can conclude that either
EQ or INEQ hold. By Proposition 3.4, the social welfare function also satisfies either EQ
or INEQ.
So, a social welfare function satisfying U, IIA, SP, A, OC and SE must lead to a
dictatorship either of the better off members of society or the worst off ones. One may
ask the social welfare function not to be a dictatorship of the better off members of society.
Condition ( MEQ - Minimal Equity). The social welfare function is not the leximax
principle.
Together these conditions and theorems lead us to the last characterization of the
leximin principle.
Theorem 3.5. The leximin principle is characterized by conditions U, IIA, SP, the in-
formational requirement OC, SE and MEQ.
Note that this is a direct consequence of Theorems 3.3, 3.4 and the leximax’s char-
acterization. In this characterization it does not appear Equity, which has been highly
questioned and appears Separability of unconcerned individuals, which was pretty claimed
amongst experts.
A diagrammatical approach
Though we have already given all results related to the leximin’s characterization, we
may stop a moment to remake those theorems we have just done in a diagrammatical
way in order to have a more intuitive idea of the issue and understand how proofs above
come to mind. We will prove Theorem 3.4 for just two individuals. The procedure will be
quite the same but emphasizing points of the plane instead of relation between vectors.
Theorem 3.6. Suppose |N | = 2. If f satisfies U, IIA, SP, A and the informational
requirement OC, then it satisfies either EQ or INEQ.
Proof. Recall that in Theorem 3.4 we used SE to go from two people who were in conflict
to the general case. In this proof, as only two individuals are considered, condition SE
will not be needed.















Our aim is to show that either the better off or the worst off of the two individuals who
are in conflict will be decisive socially. As conditions IIA and SP hold, then SN holds,
which means we can consider alternatives as points in R2. We will divide the plane in ten
different regions, as shown in Figure 3.1.
We start from reference point ū. Due to Anonymity, ū is indifferent to ū. Note that
all points x = (x1, x2) in region I and II are such that x1 > ū1 and x2 > ū2. This, by
SP means xP ū for all x in regions I and II. Same happens with points in regions II and
III regarding point ū; if x is in regions II or III, then, by SP, xP ū. Since ū and ū are
indifferent to one another, every point x in regions I, II or III is preferred to ū and to ū.
In a symmetric way, ū and ū are preferred to points y in regions V, VI and VII.
As we did in the diagrammatic proof of Arrow’s theorem, we want to prove that all
points in VIII are ranked equally against ū. By A, this would mean that all points in IX
are ranked equally against ū(and so, against ū). Let z = (z1, z2) be a point on region
VIII. Note that the following statements hold: (i) individual 1 is better off than individual
2 since z1 > z2 (ii) individual 1 is worse off in c than in ū since z1 < ū1 (iii) individual 2
is better off in c than in ū since z2 > ū2 (iv) individual 1 is better off in c than individual
2 in ū since z1 > ū2 (v) individual 2 is worse off in c than individual 1 in ū since z2 < ū1
. This means ū2 < z2 < z1 < ū1. Note that these are the premises of conditions EQ and
INEQ. To prove that all points in region VII are ranked equally against ū, let us consider
two points z = (z1, z2) and z′ = (z′1, z′2) in this region. It holds ū2 < z2 < z1 < ū1
and ū2 < z′2 < z′1 < ū1. As the informational requirement is OC, we can use an strictly
increasing transformation φ such that is maps ū and ū into themselves and z into z′.
Figure 3.2 may help to understand that this functions exists. This means z and z′ are
ranked equally against ū.
It must be, then, that all points in region VII ans IX are either preferred to ū and ū,
or indifferent to ū and ū, or ū and ū are preferred to them. If it were indifference, we
could consider two points z, z′ in region VII such that z1 < z′1 and z2 < z′2. By SP it
would hold z′Pz and, by transitivity, ūPz, which is a contradiction. So, it can only be
that points in regions VIII and IX are preferred to ū or vice versa.
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An analogous reasoning can be done with points on region X. By Anonymity, the same
would hold for region IV,so that all points in regions X and IV are either preferred to
ū or ū is preferred to them. Note that the situation of ū and ū is quite similar to the
one we have on Section 2.3. Let us use the same argument without explaining it step
by step. All we need is to find an strictly increasing transformation φ such that it maps
points in region VIII into ū and ū into a point in X This leads us to state that points
on sections VII and IX are ranked oppositely to points on sections IV and X. We have
already analysed all ten region in which we divided the plane. Only boundaries are left.
As in Arrow’s theorem, is two adjacent regions are ranked equally against ū, then points
in the boundary between these two regions are ranked in the same way as the regions.
Boundaries between regions that are not ranked in the same way will be taken care later.
What we have shown is that there are two basic possibilities: the ones shown on Figure
3.3. In this figure, regions marked with a ”b” are preferred to ū and ū and regions marked
with a ”w” ”dispreferred” against them. If regions VII and IX are preferred to ū we obtain
the first picture while if regions IV and X are the ones preferred to ū we obtain the second
one. We pointed out before that points in region VII are such that ū2 < z2 < z1 < ū1
. In a symmetric way, points in region X are such that t2 < ū2 < ū1 < t1. Let us fix
points z and t in regions VIII and X respectively and suppose they represent alternatives
a and b respectively. Let us suppose also, ū represents alternative c. So, we can write
u(c, 2) < u(a, 2) < u(a, 1) < u(c, 1) and u(b, 2) < u(c, 2) < u(c, 1) < u(b, 1). Note that
these are the premises for EQ and INEQ. Individual 1 is better of than individual 2 for a
against c, and for b against c. In conditions of Equity, individual 2 would be the dictator,
so that it would be aPc and cPb. Note that this is the case of the first picture of Figure
3.3. In the second case it holds bPc and cPa, so that individual 1 is the dictator and
condition of Inequity holds. Remind that this dictatorship is not the one defined by Arrow
(1951), but the positional dictatorship discussed in Section 3.1.
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3.3 The Utilitarian form
The utilitarian form is by far the most common and widely applied social welfare
function in economics. Under a utilitarian rule social states are ranked according to he
linear sum of utilities. Obviously, to perform the summation utilities must be cardinally
measurable. Furthermore, statements of the form ”in the move from a to b p, person
i gains more than person j loses” must be meaningful. Together, these considerations
imply that increments in utility must be both meaningful. Thus, the utilitarian form
will only be possible when working with utility functions (not with preference orderings)
and the informational requirement CIC will be needed. Formally, the utilitarian form is








Let fU be the corresponding social welfare function. It satisfies conditions U, IIA, SP,
and A.
Proposition 3.7. fU satisfies conditions U, IIA, SP and A.
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Proof. It is obvious that every profile of utility functions can be considered in the utili-
tarian rule, so it satisfies U. To show IIA, let us consider two profiles of utility functions
U1 and U2 and two alternatives a, b ∈ X such that U1(a) = U2(a) and U1(b) = U2(b).
Then,
∑
i u1(a, i) =
∑
i u2(a, i) and
∑
i u1(b, i) =
∑
i u2(b, i), so they rank the same way
a against b.
Let us now prove condition SP. To do so, let U be a profile of utility functions and a, b ∈
X alternatives such that ∀i ∈ N it holds u(a, i) ≥ u(b, i). Then it follows
∑
i u(a, i) =∑
i u(b, i) and so aR
Ub. To show A let U1 and U2 be two profiles of alternatives and σ a
permutation on N such that ∀i ∈ N and ∀a ∈ X it holds u1(a, i) = u2(a, σ(i)). In this
case,
∑
i u1(a, i) =
∑
i u2(a, σ(i)) and so they rank the same way all alternatives.
In this case we can also characterize this rule, as fU is the only social welfare function
satisfying U, IIA, SP, A and the informational requirement CIC.
Theorem 3.7 (Utilitarianism’s characterization). In the informational requirement CIC,
if |X| ≥ 3, fU is the only social welfare function satisfying U, IIA, SP and A.
Proof. We have already proved that the utilitarian form satisfies U, IIA, SP and A. It
misses to show that whenever a social welfare function satisfies these conditions, then it
is an utilitarian rule. Let us suppose, then, that f is a social welfare function satisfying
U, IIA, SP and A. Let a, b ∈ X be alternatives. We have to show that∑
i∈N u(a, i) ≥
∑
i∈N u(b, i) =⇒ aRb.
Suppose
∑
i∈N u(a, i) =
∑
i∈N u(b, i). Let us consider the ordering in Rn defined in
Proposition 2.2. Note that, due to Proposition 3.3 it inherits all properties demanded.
Let u0 (respectively v0)∈ Rn be the vectors obtained by ordering in increasing size the
members of U(a) = (u(a, 1), . . . , u(a, n)) (respectively U(b)). As Anonymity holds, we
have U(a)I∗u0 and U(b)I





0 to u0 and v0. Note that one of these vectors now has a 0 as its first number.
Now, from conditions IIA and SP, it follows u1I
∗v1 =⇒ u0I∗v0.
Note that we can repeat this process a finite number of steps m ≤ 2n until we get
um = vm = (0, . . . , 0) and, at each step k we get ukI
∗vk =⇒ uk−1I∗vk−1. So, umI∗vm =⇒
u0. But, as um = vm = (0, . . . , 0), umI
∗vm holds, and so u0I
∗v0 does. We saw above
that u0 and v0 are indifferent to U(a) and U(b) respectively, what means U(a)I
∗U(b). We
conclude, then, aIb when
∑





i∈N u(a, i) ≥
∑
i∈N u(b, i) or
∑
i∈N u(a, i) ≤
∑
i∈N u(b, i). Having an
analogous reasoning, we would get either um = (0, . . . , 0) or vm = (0, . . . , 0) (not both),
while the other would have at least one strictly positive component. This would lead us
to aPb in the first case and bPa in the second as required.
If we drop Anonymity, we are able to discriminate among members of society. This
leads us to the so called generalized utilitarianism, which is defined as follows:
aRb ⇐⇒
∑
i∈N αi · u(a, i) ≥
∑
i∈N αi · u(b, i)
with αi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and αj > 0 for at least one j ∈ N. Blackorby, Donaldson and
Weymark (1984) give a characterization of this generalized utilitarian rule.
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Conclusions
With this project I had the opportunity of learning the fundamentals of Social Choice
Theory and delve into Distributive Justice. Before starting the work I had no idea even
that Social Choice Theory even existed and little by little it has given me a deeper
understanding of how do politics and economics work and how can they be modeled in a
mathematical way. I found quite shocking that, with just basic knowledge of formal logic
and analysis, one can set up a whole framework that allows us to prove some important
and interesting results such as characterizations of the leximin principle and the utilitarian
principle.
I really enjoyed initiating myself in such a little known field. Although they had their
own difficulties, none, modeling individual decision making and studying the Arrovian
framework, presented a big deal. However, I found quite a challenge to understand and
explain notions related to the third chapter. Changing the whole framework and discern
when to use preference orderings and when utility functions required most of my atten-
tion. Besides, information was divided into some different articles and it was not easy to
assemble them into one only chapter. My work is only a small part of what I found and
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